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In their adversarial role, lawyers make arguments designed to benefi t their clients. One spe-
cifi c type of argument, a religious appeal, has been used to persuade jurors in many death 
penalty cases (e.g., Boyd v. French, 1998; Brown v. Payton, 2005; Carruthers v. State, 2000; 
Sandoval v. Calderon, 2000). Such appeals have been used in several high profi le trials, 
such as the trial of Andrea Yates, the mother who drowned her fi ve children in her bathtub 
(CNN.com, 2006). The prosecutor told the jury, “[i]t was wrong in the eyes of God and it 
was wrong in the eyes of the law.” The jury was not convinced, however, as they ultimate-
ly spared her life. 
Defense attorneys have also used religious appeals in high profi le cases. Susan Smith 
killed her sons and invented a carjacking story to cover up the crime. Smith’s attorney told 
the Biblical story of Jesus saving an adulterous woman from being stoned. He told jurors 
“He who is without sin among you, let him fi rst cast a stone ...but no stone may be thrown 
unless all are thrown” (Burritt, 1995). This argument may have been effective, as the jury re-
turned a sentence of life imprisonment despite strong public support for the death penalty 
(Morganthau, 1995). 
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Defense attorneys also use evidence of the defendant’s religiosity to persuade jurors that the 
defendant is not deserving of the death penalty (e.g., Boyd v. French, 1998; Brown v. Payton, 
2005; Miniel v. Cockrell, 2003). In the sentencing trial of Terry Nichols, the Oklahoma City 
bombing accomplice, jurors deadlocked when some jurors refused to give the death penalty. 
These jurors felt that Nichols’ recent religious conversion indicated that he could still do posi-
tive deeds while in prison (CNN.com, 2004). Because of the deadlock, Nichols was sentenced 
to life in prison. Thus, religious testimony played an important part in sparing Nichols’ life. 
These examples of Biblical appeals illustrate various ways attorneys can use religious ap-
peals and testimony to infl uence jurors. Not surprisingly, the courts have had to make impor-
tant rulings on the admissibility of these religious appeals and testimony (for reviews, see 
Blume & Johnson, 2000; Duffy, 1997; Henson, 2001; Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Simson & 
Garvey, 2001). The result is a mishmash of rulings handed down in a variety of jurisdictions. 
Court decisions about the use of religion 
Although faced with similar legal questions, courts do not agree whether or not Biblical appeals 
are acceptable. On the other hand, testimony concerning the defendant’s religiosity is generally 
acceptable as evidence of the defendant’s character (Commonwealth v. Daniels, 1994). 
Court rulings on Biblical appeals 
The most restrictive courts have prohibited all religious appeals (e.g., Sandoval v. Calderon, 
2000). For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that “reliance ... upon the Bible ... 
in support of the imposition of a penalty of death is reversible error per se (Commonwealth v. 
Chambers, 1991, p. 644).” Other courts have provided guidelines for using appeals; for example, 
they are acceptable as long as they are not excessive (State v. Phillips, 1997), do not go beyond 
the character of the defendant (State v. Cauthern, 1996), do not prejudice jurors (Cunningham v. 
Zant, 1991), or do not prevent a fair trial (State v. Ramsey, 1993). The most lenient courts have 
accepted all religious appeals, stating, for example, that they are within the scope of an attorney’s 
poetic license (Bussard v. Lockhard, 1994). 
Courts barring appeals have ruled that the prosecution’s use of Biblical appeals violates the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment (see, e.g., Sandoval v. Caul-
dron, 2000, State v. Alston, 1995). This Amendment requires jurors to be informed of legally 
relevant criteria (e.g., aggravators and mitigators) when deciding whether the defendant should 
be put to death (Furman v. Georgia, 1972; Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). Biblical law gives “all or 
nothing” commands (e.g., an “eye for an eye”), which do not provide guidance or allow for 
consideration of mitigating factors (Carruthers v. State, 2000; Sandoval v. Calderon, 2000). 
Similarly, some courts have found defense counsel’s use of Biblical appeals improper be-
cause they suggest that jurors follow a law other than state law and contradict legislative 
death penalty statutes (Commonwealth v. Daniels, 1994; Ice v. Commonwealth, 1984). The 
Ice court stated “[t]he law specifi es when the death penalty is appropriate, and .... the de-
fense counsel should [not] be permitted to [suggest a] case should be decided on religious 
grounds (p. 676).” 
Court rulings on religious testimony 
In an attempt to convince the jury to spare the defendant’s life, the defense can introduce 
evidence of the defendant’s religiosity. Prison ministers, inmates, or prison employees can 
testify that the defendant has converted to Christianity, established a prison ministry, or 
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written Christian books (e.g., Boyd v. French, 1998; Brown v. Payton, 2005; Miniel v. Cock-
rell, 2003).1 Religious evidence is generally allowed as evidence of a defendant’s character 
(Commonwealth v. Daniels, 1994), consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling that defen-
dants have a right to introduce character evidence that could be considered mitigating (Lock-
ett v. Ohio, 1978). 
Effects of religious appeals 
Attorneys who use religious appeals and testimony believe they will be infl uential, and much 
research has indicated that attorney arguments are typically persuasive (see, e.g., Voss, 2005). 
One reason that appeals could be effective is because they represent one more argument as 
compared to the condition lacking appeals. Persuasion research has indicated that the sheer 
quantity of arguments can affect the persuasiveness of a message (see, e.g., Eagly & Chaik-
en, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Stasson & Davis, 1989). Religious arguments may also be 
infl uential because they evoke jurors’ emotions. Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) 
posits that an individual who experiences an emotionally signifi cant event (e.g., a religious ap-
peal) is likely to respond experientially (e.g., based on emotions) instead of rationally (Epstein, 
1990, 1994). This makes it diffi cult to make logical judgments such as determining the prop-
er sentence for a defendant. Such theories may explain why appeals are effective. In this initial 
study, the goal is to determine whether a variety of appeals are effective and whether they in-
terfere with mock jurors’ ability to weigh aggravators and mitigators. If these basic results are 
found, future studies can determine why appeals are effective. 
While the use of religion in the courts has garnered the attention of the legal community 
(see, e.g., Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Simons, 2004), the practice has received relatively little 
empirical attention. In the only study (that we know of) manipulating the use of a religious 
appeal, Johnson (1985) found that jurors were more likely to convict a defendant when he 
used evidence of his religiosity as a defense in a child abuse trial. The current study further 
investigates the effects of religion by determining whether various types of religious appeals 
and testimony infl uence juror decision-making in death penalty sentencing trials. 
Overview of experiment 
This study was designed to reveal whether religious appeals infl uence jurors’ sentencing ver-
dicts and prevent proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Mock jurors read a 
trial scenario that manipulated the number of aggravators and mitigators, whether or not the 
prosecutor used a Biblical appeal, and the way the defense used religion (defense attorney 
uses a Biblical appeal, defendant testifi es that he has always been a Christian, defendant tes-
tifi es that he has converted to Christianity, or no use of religion). These manipulations were 
chosen because they are the most commonly used in real life trials. Testing all of these ap-
peals in one experiment allows us to compare the effectiveness of different kinds of appeals. 
After reading the trial scenario, participants issued a sentence of life in prison without parole 
or the death penalty. They also indicated their confi dence in this sentencing verdict. 
It was expected that the use of religion by the defense will lead to fewer death sentences as 
compared to a control group, with the exception of the “Always Christian” group. According 
to Johnson (1985), it was predicted that a defendant who testifi es that he has always been a 
Christian will be treated more punitively than the control condition. It was also expected that 
1 While defendants sometimes convert to religions other than Christianity, the vast majority of cases involve 
a Christian conversion. 
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religious appeals used by the prosecutor would lead to more death sentences. Based on legal 
concerns that religious appeals interfere with jurors’ “channeled discretion,” it was also pre-
dicted that both types of religious appeals would prevent jurors from properly weighing ag-
gravators and mitigators (i.e., we predicted an interaction between the presence of a religious 
appeal and the strength of the evidence [more aggravators vs. more mitigators]). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 265 community members from a mid-sized Midwestern community who 
were paid $20 each. They were told they would be participating in a mock trial but were not 
told about the study’s purpose (i.e., to explore the effects of religious appeals). Before read-
ing the trial summary, participants answered a death qualifi cation question based on the le-
gal standard established in Wainwright v. Witt (1985). Sixty-four (24%) participants who 
indicated that their sentiments about the death penalty were so strong that they would se-
riously affect their performance as a juror were excluded from the study. Eleven addition-
al participants were eliminated because they failed to answer a large portion of the survey. 
Finally, six participants were eliminated because they failed to answer correctly a majori-
ty (two out of three) of the manipulation check questions. The fi nal sample consisted of 184 
participants, the majority of whom were Caucasian (90%) and female (58%). They ranged 
in age from 18–87 years (M = 42.8, Mdn = 42) and had a variety of religious backgrounds 
(63% Protestant, 15% Catholic). 
Procedure and study design 
After reading and signing consent forms, participants completed the death qualifi ca-
tion question naire and read the trial summary and judge’s instructions. The questionnaire 
asked participants to indicate their individual sentencing decision (life in prison without pa-
role or a death sen tence) and how certain they were in their sentence. Three manipulation 
check questions assessed whether participants were aware of the religious appeal/testimo-
ny manipulations.2 
The design was a 2 (Case facts: High Aggravators/High Mitigators) × 4 (Defense use of 
religion: defendant became a Christian while in prison/defendant has always been a Chris-
tian/the defense attorney makes a Biblical appeal for mercy/control condition) × 2 (Prosecu-
tion use of religion: retributive Biblical appeal/control condition) between-groups factorial. 
Cells averaged 11.5 participants, with cell sizes ranging from eight to 16 participants. 
Materials 
The written trial summary described the penalty phase of a capital trial. The summary was 
approximately 1900 words long and contained a summary of the case facts and closing argu-
ments. The summary was based on State v. Daniels (1994), a North Carolina case in which a 
man was sentenced to death for murdering his aunt. During the sentencing phase of the actu-
al trial, both the prosecutor and defense attorney used religious appeals. 
2 Gender and religious differences (e.g., devotionalism, fundamentalism) were also measured. Because these 
measures revealed few consistent differences, these analyses are not included for brevity. Results are available 
from the fi rst author. 
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The nature of the crime was manipulated through the inclusion or exclusion of aggravators 
(e.g., crime was committed for pecuniary gain or was part of a series of crimes) and mitigators 
(e.g., defendant confessed and cooperated with authorities or is a good candidate for rehabili-
tation). The trial summary contained one of two fact patterns: One trial summary favored the 
death penalty (four aggravators and two mitigators), and the other summary favored a sentence 
of life in prison without the possibility of parole (two aggravators and four mitigators). 
The prosecutor’s use of religion was also manipulated in the trial summary. In the “Pros-
ecutor appeal” condition, the prosecutor quoted the Bible during the closing argument (i.e., 
“[God] commands us to take ‘an eye for an eye’ and ‘a tooth for a tooth.’ This means that if 
someone kills someone, he or she also should be put to death”). In the control condition, the 
prosecutor did not use a Biblical appeal during his closing argument. 
Finally, the use of religion by the defense was manipulated. In the “Defense Attorney Ap-
peal” condition, the defense attorney used a Biblical appeal in closing argument (i.e., “Jesus 
tells us ‘You have heard that it has been said “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” but I 
say to you, do not resist an evil doer. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the oth-
er also.’ Jesus, the example God sent for us to follow, practiced forgiveness”). In the “Con-
verted Christian” condition, the defendant testifi ed that, since going to prison, he has convert-
ed to Christianity and now understands that God condemns his killing, yet is forgiving. In the 
“Always Christian” condition, the defendant testifi ed that he has always been a Christian and 
knows that God feels what he did was wrong, but nevertheless forgives. In the control condi-
tion, neither the defendant’s testimony nor the attorney’s closing argument mentioned religion. 
The judge’s instructions and verdict form were based on those used in North Carolina. The 
instructions, which were approximately 2500 words long, defi ned each of the aggravators and 
mitigators and how the jurors should weigh factors in making the sentencing decision. 
Results 
Courts have expressed concern that religious appeals will affect jurors’ sentencing verdicts. 
A three-way ANOVA was performed to reveal the effects of case type, prosecutorial appeals 
and defense use of religion on jurors’ verdicts. The primary dependent variable was a “ver-
dict confi dence” score, which was created by multiplying the participant’s sentencing ver-
dict and the level of confi dence in that verdict (7 point scale), resulting in a score ranging 
from −7 (highly confi dent in a death sentence) to +7 (highly confi dent in a life sentence). 
This measure is similar to that used in previous studies (Cook, Arndt, & Lieberman, 2004; 
Huntley & Costanzo, 2003). Tukey’s HSD was used to perform post-hoc analyses. Table 1 
summarizes the fi ndings. 
     There was a signifi cant main effect for case type, F(1, 161) = 7.6, p < .01. As expect-
ed, participants in the High Aggravators condition (M = .81) were more punitive than those 
in the High Mitigators condition (M = 3.16). Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no main 
effect for prosecution appeal, F(1, 161) = .31, p > .05. There was a main effect on verdict 
confi dence for the type of appeal used by the defendant, F(3, 161) = 3.08, p < .05, with a 
signifi cant difference between the “Converted Christian” (M = 3.4) condition, where partic-
ipants were least punitive, and the “Defense Attorney Appeal” condition, where participants 
were most punitive (M = .3, p < .05). There were no other signifi cant differences among the 
groups, including the “Always Christian” (M = 1.8) and control groups (M = 1.8). 
      Another concern that courts have expressed over religious appeals is that the appeals 
would interfere with jurors’ ability to weigh aggravators and mitigators, as required by law. 
Proper weighing occurs when participants favor a life sentence signifi cantly more when they 
read the High Mitigators case than when they read the High Aggravators case. Alternatively, 
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if there is no signifi cant difference between the High Aggravators and High Mitigators con-
ditions, then it would indicate that jurors were unable to weigh the evidence properly. 
There was a signifi cant interaction between case type and defense appeal, F(3, 161) = 
2.8, p < .05, which indicated that the control group and the “Converted Christian” group 
were able to weigh aggravators and mitigators properly. However, the “Always Christian” 
and “Defense Attorney Appeal” groups were not (see Fig. 1).3 For the Control group partic-
ipants, the High Mitigators group (M = 4.3) favored a life sentence signifi cantly more than 
the High aggravator group (M = −.13; p < .05). Similarly, for the Converted Christian group, 
the High Mitigators group (M = 5.8) favored a life sentence signifi cantly more than the High 
Aggravators group (M = 1.3; p < .05). This indicates that both the control and Converted 
Christian groups could weigh aggravators and mitigators properly. On the other hand, the 
Always Christian group could not; the High Mitigators participants (M = 2.5) did not differ 
from the High Aggrava tors participants (M =1.4, p >.05). Similarly, in the Defense Attorney 
appeal group, the High Mitigators participants (M = −.04) did not differ from the High Ag-
gravators group (M = .07; p > .05). Because participants in the High Aggravators condition 
did not differ from partici pants in the High Mitigators condition, these types of religious ap-
peals interfere with proper weighing. 
Looking at the interaction another way reveals that, in the High Aggravators condition, 
there were no differences among any of the four defense appeal conditions. This indicates 
that defense use of religion did not affect verdict confi dence when there were several aggra-
vating circum stances. However, when there were several mitigating circumstances (i.e., in 
the High Mitigators condition), “Defense Attorney Appeal” participants were more puni-
tive than Converted Christian (p <.001) and Control (p <.05) participants. None of the other 
conditions differed signifi cantly. Other interactions were not signifi cant. 
3 Although the “Always Christian” group means are in the direction that would indicate proper weighing (High 
Aggravators participants were more punitive than the High Mitigators participants), the effect of evidence strength 
in this condition was not signifi cant, indicating that they could not properly weigh aggravators and mitigators. 
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Discussion 
The use of religion has recently been discussed in various courtrooms (e.g., Brown v. Payton, 
2005; Daniels v. Lee, 2003), in the legal literature (Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Simons, 2004), 
and in empirical investigation (Johnson, 1985). Courts fear that appeals improperly affect 
sentences and interfere with the jurors’ weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors (e.g., 
Carruthers v. State, 2000). The present research fi nds partial support for these concerns. 
     The prosecutorial Biblical appeal used in this study did not infl uence juror decision-making; 
however it should not be assumed that all prosecution appeals are harmless, as this study only 
tested one appeal in one trial. On the other hand, the defense attorney’s use of religious appeals 
and evidence did affect decision-making. Mock jurors were the least punitive toward a defen-
dant who had converted to Christianity. Participants in this study, like the Terry Nichols ju-
rors, might have believed that the defendant has changed his ways and can still positively con-
tribute to society. Other uses of religion (e.g., appeals from the attorney) may be less effective 
than testimony about a religious conversion because they are simple acts (e.g., quoting the Bi-
ble) that require little effort. Although a defendant could provide evidence of being a lifelong 
Christian (e.g., frequent church attendance) that would support his appeal, simply claiming to 
be a lifelong Christian without supporting evidence (as the defendant in the scenario did) re-
quires little effort. In contrast, conversion requires more effort (e.g., going to church, leading a 
prison ministry), which might make the appeal more convincing and infl uential. 
     Another possibility is that a defendant who has converted to Christianity is treated more 
leniently because he is perceived to be more remorseful and sincere than defendants in oth-
er conditions. A defendant who realizes his mistake and has changed his ways is likely to be 
perceived as more remorseful than a defendant whose attorney quotes the Bible. Claiming to 
be a lifelong Christian similarly does not convey such a high level of remorse. Past research 
has indicated that defendants are more likely to receive forgiveness from the jury if they are 
remorseful (see Simons, 2004), perhaps because norms surrounding apologies lead jurors to 
forgive when asked (see Bennett & Dewberry, 1994; Takaku, Weiner, & Ohbuchi, 2001). 
     Additionally, a Converted Christian could be perceived more favorably than a lifelong 
Christian because jurors have trouble understanding how a lifetime Christian could perform 
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such an evil act. Haney (2004) explains the “empathic divide” that occurs when the jurors can-
not “humanize” or identify with a defendant whose life is so much different from theirs. Jurors 
likely have diffi culty comprehending a lifetime Christian’s motive for murder, making the task 
of hu manizing him diffi cult. Alternatively, a converted Christian could be seen as having tran-
sitioned from an evil lifestyle that led to his behavior. This positive transition toward a more 
normative lifestyle could explain why converted Christians win favor in jurors’ eyes. 
Interestingly, mock jurors were the most punitive toward a defendant whose attorney quot-
ed Biblical scripture prescribing mercy. Perhaps jurors felt that the appeal was a defense tactic 
that misused religion. Research has demonstrated that expert witnesses are viewed as less cred-
ible when they are paid (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000; Ivkovic &Hans, 2003) and that paid sales 
assistants are seen as less credible than fellow shoppers (Harris, Davies, & Baron, 1997). Oth-
er research indicates that the American public views attorneys negatively (Pearce, 1999). In ad-
dition, attorneys do not swear under oath, possibly making them appear even less credible. This 
suggests that paid advocates are seen as untrustworthy sources who will say anything to ob-
tain the desired outcome. Much research has indicated that low-credibility sources are less per-
suasive than their more credible counterparts (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This could explain 
why attorney appeals, whether by the prosecution or the defense, were not as persuasive as in-
tended. It is especially important to note that, in the High Mitigators case, “Defense Attorney 
Appeal” participants were signifi cantly more confi dent in a death sentence than participants in 
the control condition. Defense attorneys should take note that their use of Biblical appeals can 
backfi re, especially if there are mitigating factors in the case. 
This research also reveals that the fear that appeals will interfere with jurors’ ability to 
weigh aggravators and mitigators may be a legitimate concern. Although prosecution appeals 
did not affect the ability to weigh aggravators and mitigators, two of the three defense appeals 
did. While the Control group and “Converted Christian” groups were able to weigh aggrava-
tors and mitigators properly, the “Always Christian” and “Defense Attorney Appeal” groups 
were uninfl uenced by the strength of the evidence. It is possible that jurors experiencing these 
two appeals were angered that the defendant would use religion in that way. As noted above, 
a claim that one should be shown mercy—merely because he is a lifelong Christian or based 
on a Biblical quote from the attorney—may be seen as insincere. Perhaps the negative emotion 
triggered by the (mis)use of religion made jurors unable to weigh aggravators and mitigators. 
In sum, the current study utilized realistic materials (i.e., based on real court case) and a 
community sample of mock jurors to test the effects of religious appeals. Although the expla-
nations for the results are speculative, this initial study provides evidence that some types of 
religious appeals and testimony do improperly affect jurors’ decisions. Future research should 
investigate these explanations and replicate the fi ndings using different manipulations. 
Conclusions 
Lawyers have long used Biblical appeals and presented testimony of the defendant’s religi-
osity, prompting some courts to express their disapproval (e.g., Sandoval v. Calderon, 2000). 
Although there has been an increasing amount of attention given to the effects of religion in 
the courtroom, little empirical research has been conducted. Results of the current study indi-
cate that the courts could be justifi ed in their concerns over religious appeals. Specifi cally, ap-
peals by defense counsel can be detrimental to the defendant and can prevent jurors’ proper 
weighing of aggravators and mitigators. Although additional research is needed to investigate 
more fully a wide range of appeals with a diversity of jurors, it would be wise for courts, law-
yers and policymakers to be wary of the use of religious appeals in capital sentencing trials. 
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